Q+A: QVC Is Still Selling, But Is Anyone Buying?

QVC, the pioneer of home-shopping television, is facing several financial challenges – including changes to its customer base – that could lead the company to voluntarily restructure its debt and, ultimately, file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

While consumer demographics and habits have changed since the height of QVC’s success, marketing strategy experts, like Lawrence Duke, EdD, see a path forward for the company. Duke, a clinical professor of marketing in Drexel University’s LeBow College of Business, spoke with The Drexel News Blog about how external forces have shaped the trajectory of QVC’s outlook and how the company can find success again.   

How has QVC’s customer base changed?

Historically, QVC’s business was built on a loyal audience—primarily women aged 50 and older—who engaged through scheduled television programming. This demographic delivered strong repeat purchasing and dependable customer lifetime value. That consistency made forecasting easier and reduced pressure on customer acquisition.

However, that core customer group is aging and gradually shrinking. Recent filings indicate that active customers have declined approximately 9–12% year over year. At the same time, cord-cutting and changing media consumption habits have reduced television viewership, weakening the channel that originally sustained QVC’s growth.

Although QVC has successfully shifted sales online, its most profitable customers still skew older. In effect, the company’s channel transformation has outpaced its demographic renewal.

How has this impacted the company?

The customer shift has had measurable financial consequences. Revenue in QVC’s core QxH segment (QVC + HSN) has declined approximately 10–11% year over year.

To adapt, the company has significantly expanded its digital footprint. Roughly 65% of total revenue now comes from eCommerce, and more than 70% of digital sales occur via mobile devices. Social and live-stream commerce initiatives have also reported growth of more than 30% in certain reporting periods.

QVC has already become a digital-first retailer. However, digital growth has not yet fully offset losses in the legacy broadcast channel, contributing to continued top-line pressure.

Who is QVC competing with today?

While QVC acquired HSN in 2017, reducing direct television competition, its competitive landscape has broadened substantially. The competitive shift is not simply about other retailers; it is about platforms that control attention.

Today, QVC competes for consumer attention and spending against:

  • Amazon, which dominates in convenience and logistics.
  • TikTok Shop and other live social commerce platforms.
  • Influencer-led commerce on Instagram and YouTube.
  • Low-cost marketplaces such as Shein and Temu.
  • Large omnichannel retailers like Walmart and Target.

Unlike in its earlier years, QVC no longer operates in a relatively closed distribution environment. It competes in a crowded digital marketplace where attention is fragmented and switching costs are low.

Is there a way for QVC to update its model?

Several strategic paths may be possible.

One approach would be to streamline operations and to emphasize a lean, digital-first live-commerce platform. Another would be to focus more intentionally on the 50+ demographic, positioning QVC as a trusted, community-centered shopping destination for an affluent but often overlooked segment. A third option would be to differentiate through curated expertise, emphasizing host credibility and product storytelling rather than price competition.

Each option carries tradeoffs in cost structure, brand positioning and customer acquisition strategy.

What else is important to understanding the potential bankruptcy narrative?

Financial leverage is a critical part of the story. QVC Group reports approximately $6.6 billion in total debt. When revenue is declining, high leverage reduces flexibility and increases vulnerability during transition.

In addition, legacy cost structures—such as studio infrastructure and broadcast operations—were built for scale in a television-dominant era. Digital-native competitors often operate with lower fixed costs, creating structural disadvantages during transformation.

Is there anything else you’d like to add to the conversation?

QVC’s challenge is not a failure to enter digital commerce; digital channels already account for the majority of revenue. Rather, the company faces the more complex task of replacing an aging customer base, competing in a fragmented attention economy and managing financial leverage while its legacy channel contracts.

From a marketing strategy lens, QVC illustrates how demographic change, technological disruption, competition and capital structure can converge. Transformation is possible—but it requires customer renewal, cost realignment and disciplined financial management occurring simultaneously.

Ultimately, the question is not whether QVC can sell online—it clearly can—but whether it can realign its economics with the realities of digital competition.

Reporters interested in speaking with Duke should contact Annie Korp, associate director, News and Media Relations, at 215-571-4244 or amk522@drexel.edu.